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Reforming Alabama's Constitution 
Angela K. Lewis• 
George Munchus 
University of Alabama at Birmingham 
Since the p assage of th e Ala b ama Co ns tituti on of 19 01 , 
many citizens and p oli ti ca l l ea ders in A labama ha ve at -
tempted unsuccessf ull y to rewr it e it . A !th o ug h A la ba ma 
has made prog ress in ref o rm ing th e co nstit u t ion w ith th e 
work of a co nstit ut io nal co mmi ssio n in 19 7 3, mu c h wo rk 
rema ins. 
The focus of this article is constitutional reform in Ala-bama. We divide the article into two sections. The first section reviews methods of constitutional change in the 
American states and explores reasons for success or failure. The 
next section discusses the history of constitutional change in Al-
abama and it includes summaries of the public's opinions about 
constitutional change in that Alabama. 
METH ODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Constitutional revision in the American states has occurred 
with varying frequency, often with significant partisan political 
influence (Goodman et al., 1973). In a typical scenario, change 
initiatives originate among the educated, the upper-middle class 
who advocate "good government" as a basis of political support. 
Upwardly mobile lower income groups and institutional repre-
sentatives, such as state legislators and agency heads, are more 
likely to oppose constitutional change as a threat to the status 
quo and their positions of power in state politics. Maj or revisions 
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of constitutions or the complete rewriting of the document 
through a state constitutional convention is not common practic-
es in the states. In the 19th century, there were numerous revi-
sions of state constitutions, as well as adoptions of constitutions 
by new states. The 1800s saw the adoption of ninety-four state 
constitutions. The 20th century only saw twenty-three new con-
stitutions. The 21st century, though relatively young, has not seen 
a single, new constitution (Tarr 2002). 
Shortly before the beginning of the 20th century, many 
Southern states revised their constitutions because of a backlash 
of the populist movement (Rogers and Ward 1994). Southern 
elites, seeking a way to disenfranchise Blacks and poor whites 
used a constitutional framework to do so. Most of these constitu-
tions did not conform to the United States Constitution and were 
challenged extensively, especially beginning in the 1960s. For 
example, Georgia had ultimately to adopt a new constitution 
in1975 after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Georgia "coun-
ty unit" electoral system. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
county unit system violated the "one person, one vote" rule (Hill 
1994). 
One way to change a state constitution is to add an amend-
ment. Likewise, some states may call a constitutional convention 
to change their state's legal document. Adding amendments is 
the more common method. Several state constitutions have over 
one hundred amendments (Tarr 2002). Change by an1endment is 
a more piecemeal approach than a constitutional convention, 
which usually takes a comprehensive approach. The amendment 
process requires two steps-initiation and ratification. There are 
three methods to initiate an amendment-legislative action, state 
convention, or the initiative and referendum. Legislative action 
requires a majority vote of both houses of the state legislature 
before the people vote on it. States use conventions to propose 
general election amendments to an existing document. Several 
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states allow the addition of constitutional amendments by the 
initiative. The initiative begins with a petition that requires acer-
tain percentage of signatures as specified in the existing state 
constitution. Once verified, the amendment goes directly to the 
general election ballot. The most successful method, which 
usually results in voter approval, is legislative initiation. Howev-
er, research indicates that the larger the legislative majority re-
quired for initiation, the fewer amendments proposed (Lutz 
1996). A majority vote is typically required in the general elec-
tion (or in a legislative vote after the general election in states 
that require it) for an amendment to talce effect (Bartley 1960; 
Lutz 1996). 
A constitutional convention is a more controversial ap-
proach. Often the proposal for convening a convention does not 
win approval from the state legislature, or, if authoriz.ed by the 
legislature, often does not win majority approval in a general 
election referendum. Scholars characteriz.e constitutional con-
ventions as more democratic and as an expression of "the direct 
voice of the people in matters affecting general constitutional 
overhaul" (Bartley 1960, 32). Conventions give opportunities for 
citiz.ens to re-evaluate and re-assess political institutions. They 
are "instruments, of normal constitutional evolution" (Bebout 
and Sady 1960, 69). 
Procedurally, a constitutional convention is an ad hoc, or 
temporary, body. Depending on the state, it may result from a 
popular initiative or from a popularly approved legislative pro-
posal. The convention's authorization legislation describes its 
jurisdiction. States form conventions to do one of two things, to 
revise the document in its entirety or to add amendments to an 
existing constitution. Occasionally, a convention may propose 
enough amendments to make the proposed revisions comprehen-
sive. The legislature typically sets the time and place for the 
convention meeting, stipulates the selection of delegates, and 
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makes appropnatlons for expenses. Either legislators appoint 
delegates or they may be elected from districts of equal popula -
tion (Dealey 1907). The work of the convention must be com-
pleted in a final recommendation (Goodman et al., 1973). If the 
convention does draw up a new, comprehensive constitution, it 
goes to the voters. Voters may accept the document as their new 
fundamental law or reject the document thus keeping the old 
constitution. 
Historically , there have been approximately 240 conventions 
called to revise constitutions (Bartley 1960). Nine states have 
adapted a mandatory, periodic vote on a constitutional conven-
tion. Hawaii mandates an election every 9 years, the fewest 
number of years between calls of any state. Alaska requires a 
constitutional call every 10 years. Most often, the call for a new 
constitutional convention fails. Sitting legislators are typically 
reluctant to act if the authority to convene a constitutional con-
vention is with the existing legislature . 
Even in cases where the legislature has called a convention , 
many problems persist. State legislatures frequently linlit the 
scope and power of the convention to prevent consideration of 
controversial issues. Adequate representation in the selection of 
delegates is another concern. As a result, only one state in the 
past thirty years has used a constitutional convention and only 
three states have revised their document over the past 35 years. 
Most state constitutions have come to resemble a lengthy code of 
laws compared to the national constih1tion with its relatively few 
amendments. Compared to the difficulties of conventions , the 
relative ease of amendment procedures has led to many state 
constitutions having hundreds of amendments (Hargrave 1991). 
An alternative to a convention or piecemeal amendment is 
the constitutional commission . The commission approach has 
grown in popularity because it is less costly than a constitutional 
convention and becau se it linlits the extent of constitutional revi -
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sion. A commission is usually composed of a select group of 
individuals, typically academic, business, and political leaders, 
appointed by the legislature or the governor to make recommen-
dations. Appointment may raise doubts about representativeness. 
Another disadvantage may be the reluctance of an appointed 
group actually to campaign for political approval of its propos-
als . 
Because of legal and political barriers to state constitutional 
change, most scholars today would suggest reliance on the 
amendment process. In a comprehensively revised constitutional 
proposal, many voters will find at least one part to oppose and 
thus reject the entire proposal. An approach to revision using 
major amendments allows more time for debate and reflection on 
each one, while moving steadily toward an overall goal of com-
prehensive change. Since the electorate votes on controversial 
parts separately, there is an increased chance of approval of at 
least some of them (Goodman et al.1973), especially when com-
pared to an up or down vote at once on a totally revised constitu-
tion. Alabama faces the pros and cons of the various approaches 
to state constitutional change as it weighs alternatives for consti-
tutional reform. 
THE ALABAMA CASE . 
Alabama's political history is typical of a Deep South state 
in which one-party politics dominated and matters of race were 
central well into the 20th century. After the end of Reconstruction 
in the 1870s, white populists who were mired in poverty and 
threatened by political subordination challenged the traditionalis-
tic, established, white Democratic Party elite and its alliance 
with selected, loyal blacks. Racial tension became a popular way 
to discredit the elite's tolerance of their former slaves as well as 
a way to disfranchise black voters. 
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To reassert traditional, one-party control, the Sayre Election 
Law was passed in the 1892-1893 Alabama legislative session to 
restrict the voting rights of illiterate or semi-illiterate white or 
black voters. That way, elites could continue to control the po-
pulists' challenge by weeding out the less predictable whites and 
simultaneously win the support of decent whites at the expense 
of black representation. Any symbol of party or office that might 
help an illiterate voter, black or white was removed from the bal-
lot and candidates for office were listed in alphabetical order. 
Voters had to cast their ballots within five minutes and could 
only ask for help from polling officials appointed by the Demo-
cratic governor. The political effect of the Sayre Election Law 
was magnified by electoral fraud. In counties where blacks were 
a substantial percentage of the population, the white Democratic 
Party won majorities over white populists or black Republicans 
where no majority existed by "stuffing ballot boxes, voting in 
and counting out at will" (Jackson 2002, 17). 
Any hope for a political alliance between white populists and 
black Republicans was snuffed in a movement for a constitution-
al convention to revise Alabama's constitution of 1875. Elimi-
nating the black vote was a central reason for what became the 
Constitutional Convention of 1901. When white Alabama Dem-
ocrats learned that Mississippi and other southern states were 
being allowed by the United States courts to disenfranchise igno-
rant and incompetent voters , the political question of the day be-
came how to "relieve the state ' of the burden of the black man' 
and get rid of many poor white voters in the process" (Jackson 
2002, 19). 
By 1896, the newly elected governor, Joseph F. Johnston, 
called for a constitutional convention. The state legislature ap-
proved in 1898, but quickly repealed its decision through the 
emergence of a temporary coalition of Democrats and populists . 
Shortly thereafter , white conservatives, the old Democratic elite, 
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abandoned its earlier position of working with blacks by launch-
ing a campaign to reassert its dominance by "bringing honesty 
back into government" through restriction of black voters. The 
campaign worked and on April 1, 1901, voters approved a con-
stitutional convention 70,305 to 45,505. A large percentage of 
the votes in favor of the convention derived from counties where 
blacks outnumbered whites, a clear suggestion of fraud. 
Convention delegates were chosen from House and Senate 
districts and no poor whites or blacks attended. John B. Knox, 
convention president, made clear in his opening address that es-
tablishing white supremacy was the focus of the convention, not 
eliminating voter fraud or expanding black representation. The 
vexing question was how to disenfranchise blacks without disen-
franchising whites. The debate over how to accomplish this task 
was held in secret and the Committee on Suffrage and Election 
reported on June 30th• It recommended males over twenty-one be 
allowed to vote if residency requirements were met, a poll tax of 
$1.50 was paid, they could read or write English, and had been 
involved in a lawful business for the past 12 months or owned 40 
acres of land. Moreover, those who had been convicted of one of 
the 30 crimes listed ( crimes of which typically blacks had been 
accused), they could not vote. Since many of these requirements 
also disfranchised whites, a temporary measure was included to 
allow individuals to register until January 1, 1903, if they met 
other requirements, which included service in a war, being a des-
cendant of a veteran, or a man of good character who understood 
citizenshi~a clear exception for former Confederate soldiers. 
These provisions-the grandfather clause, poll tax, and tempo-
rary plan-passed 104 to 14 at the convention. 
Black Alabamians did not react favorably to the conven-
tion's decision. Several prominent blacks, including Booker T. 
Washington, wrote letters to the convention. He argued that del-
egates at the constitutional convention should allow blacks to 
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vote and have their votes counted since they paid taxes and per-
formed other citizenship duties. Most of the letters argued th~t if 
blacks were denied an education and the right to vote "there will 
be [a] danger that he will become a beast, reveling in crime and a 
body of death around the neck of the State" (Jackson 2002, 28). 
The efforts of Washington did not convince convention dele-
gates. The convention also ignored hopes for reform in the 1875 
document, such as home rule for local governments and manda-
tory funding of infrastructure or education. 
Alabama citizens ignored black protests against ratifying the 
new constitution and arguments made by conservatives who 
stated that the constitution would maintain white supremacy and 
foster honest elections. The constitution was ratified 190,347 to 
108,613. Only 30,000 votes came from black majority coun-
ties-a clear indication of voter intimidation or fraud. 
After the ratification of the 1901 constitution, the number of 
black voters decreased dramatically . By 1903, the State of Ala-
bama only allowed 2,980 blacks to vote of the approximately 
181,000 blacks eligible to vote in 1900. During the same period, 
the number of eligible white voters also declined by approx-
imately 41,300 (Flynt 2002). The result was a more controllable, 
unified, one-party electorate. 
Pressure to change the 1901 constitution has persisted since 
its adoption. In 1915, Governor Emmet O'Neal unsuccessfully 
advocated a new constitution due to a lack of funding for roads 
and public education-essential elements in state economic de-
velopment. At the request of Governor B.M. Miller in 1931, The 
Brookings Institution issued a report suggesting a new constitu-
tional convention, but no action occurred. Beginning in 1957, 
Governor Jim Folsom called special legislative sessions to enact 
a constitutional convention on several occasions without result. 
It was not until 1969 that Governor Albert P. Brewer has 
some success in constitutional revision. He recommended a con-
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stitutional commission to propose revisions to the 1901 docu-
ment. Both the governor and members of the legislature chose a 
twenty-one member commission of white men to study the con-
stitution. During the work of the commission, Governor Brewer 
lost the election to George Wallace who was uninterested in con-
stitutional reform. However, the commission continued to work 
and released an interim report in 1971 and the final report in 
1973. The report concluded, "The 1901 constitution, with its 
[then] 327 amendments, is obsolete and should be replaced by a 
constitution that is more adequate for the citizens of the state and 
for their government, both state and local" (Stewart 2002, 55). 
Although the legislature did not act on the commission's 
entire report, the legislature did ultimately pass an amendment to 
reform the court system. Chief Justice Howell Heflin made 
reform of the state's court system a cornerstone of his judicial 
electoral campaign and pursued passage of an amendment creat-
ing a unified court system in Alabama. These reform efforts 
made Alabama's courts one of the most efficient systems in the 
nation. 
In 1979, Governor Forrest James named a committee that 
recommended changes that ultimately passed the Senate but was 
stalled and expired in the House. In 1982, lieutenant governor 
Bill Baxley and state senator Ryan DeGraffenried attempted to 
recompile the entire document and send it to the state legislature 
as one comprehensive amendment. The new proposed constitu-
tion passed both houses in the legislature and voters had to de-
cide whether to adopt the new constitution. However, the 
Alabama Supreme court ruled that the legislature did not have 
the authority to "put before the voters a new constitution in the 
guise of a single amendment to the present document" (Stewart 
2002, 57). Thus, the new document never received a vote of the 
citizens of Alabama. 
VOL. 37 2008 
170 LEWIS & MUNCHUS 
Since the early 1990s, several attempts have been made to 
call a constitutional convention. In 1993, the Senate passed a 
resolution calling for a convention, but the leader of the House 
killed the measure. More recently, in 2002, Governor Siegelman 
suggested that the legislature give the voters a right to call a con-
vention. However, the legislature did not endorse this measure 
before the deadline to place the measure on the November ballot. 
Similarly, a recent proposal to call a constitutional convention 
stalled in the state legislative session ending June 7, 2007 (Tarr, 
2007). 
Although federal law eventually overrode discriminatory 
provisions in the Alabama constitution of 1901, many of these 
provisions remain in the document. For example, Alabamians 
recently voted on referenda to repeal two particular sections of 
the document that were racist. One banned interracial marriages; 
the other mandated segregated schools. The first referendum 
barely passed in a 1996 state referendum and the second referen-
dum in the 2004 election failed. 
The Campaign for Constitutional Reform in Alabama 
Although the most recent attempt to call a constitutional 
convention failed in the legislature, there are groups that contin-
ue to fight for constitutional change in Alabama. An extensive 
grass roots organization has sought to increase public awareness 
of the need of constitutional change. The most notable grass 
roots organization is Alabama Citizen's for Constitutional 
Reform (ACCR). ACCR is a public interest group formed in 
2000 to assist in drafting a new constitution for Alabama. Some 
of its notable members include a journalism professor from the 
University of Alabama, Samford University's president, a former 
governor, and a former U.S. representative (Flynt 2002) . ACCR 
has campaigned and held public meetings throughout the state 
since its inception to develop support for constitutional change 
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In addition to the ACCR's grass-roots approach, the media 
has increased public awareness about the issue. Newspapers 
from around the state have r editorial series to increase public 
awareness of constitutional reform. evertheless, several ques-
tions remain, among them, do Alabamians support of constitu-
tional reform? Which method of constitutional reform would 
Alabamians prefer? Finally, because of the history of the 1901 
document, are there differences between the views of whites and 
blacks on constitutional reform? 
Alabamia ns' Views on Constitutional Reform 
The ACCR conducted a telephone survey of a representative 
sample of 600 registered voters in Alabama in March 2002. The 
margin of error is +/-4%. Table 1 displays the results of the sur-
vey. 
Aware ness. The data in Table 1 indicate that a large number 
of survey participants (562 respondents of the 600 surveyed) are 
aware of proposals to rewrite the constitution. While political 
awareness is not a guarantee of success for reformers, it does 
suggest a citizen body at least lmowledgeable of the subject mat-
ter. However, of those surveyed, a substantial proportion of 
blacks remain unaware of constitutional reform efforts ( 41 % 
compared to 22% of whites). Lower awareness may lead to low-
er levels of black participation in a constitutional convention. 
However, after the failure of the amendment to end segregated 
schools in the 2004 election, more blacks may become aware of 
needs to change the constitution. 
Suppo rt. As shown in Table 1, approximately 70% of Ala-
bamians are aware of proposals to rewrite the constitution, but 
fewer than two-thirds of them support constitutional reform. 
About three-fourths of blacks agree that the constitution needs 
reform while slightly less than 60% of whites have the same 
view. There is no noteworthy, underlying positive or negative 
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association between race and interest or support for constitution-
al reform. 
Reason to Support. Nearly two-thirds of reform supporters 
declare the existing constitution needs rewriting because it is 
outdated . About 20% of respondents feel that the existing consti-
tution is too long or too complicated and that there is a need to 
simplify it; 11 % feel that tax policy and tax issues are reasons to 
change the constitution, while another 2% focus on the need for 
Table 1 
Comprehensive Results of Survey Of Alabama Citizens Regarding 
Constitutional Reform 
Percent saying "Yes" (Nin parenthesis) 
.. -= 
.:,: ~ e b.O 
~ e C " :c .. 0 .. .. ... ,... =i ~ c., v.i 
Awareness 69 (562) 59 (71) 78 (322) 0.31 Weak 
Support 60 (390) 75 (53) 58 (186) 0.16 Weak 
Reason to Favor 90 (237) 87 (46) 91 (167) 0.82 Strong positive 
Reason to oppose 80 (99) 77 (10) 80 (69) 0 .66 Moderate positive 
pecilies changes 51 (437) 42 (43) 49 (164) -0.02 No ne 
Prefer legislature 12 (562) 36 (31) 15 (36) -0.06 Moderate negative 
Prefer convention 68 (562) 72 (87) 69 (304) 0.38 Weak 
Elect delegates 84 (562) 79 (96) 86 (379) 0 .72 Strong positive 
Appoint delegates 67 (562) 56 (68) 70 (309) 0.40 Weak 
Note : Gamma is a measure of association that is based on concordant and discordant 
pairs . If the number of concordant pairs exceeds the number of discordant pairs , there 
is relative support for a positive relationship between two variables . In this case, the 
association is between race and agreement about a feature of constitutional reform. 
Gamma is standardized between plus or minus one to indicate the positive or negative 
direction of the relationship as well as it relative strength. See Kenneth J. Meier , 
Jeffrey L Brudney , and John Bohte , Applied Statistics for Public and Nonprofit Ad-
ministration , 6th ed. Belmont, California : Thompson-Wadsworth , 2006. 
improvement in education funding. About 8% see a need to 
promote home rule and reduce state control over local govern-
ments. Respondents also mention that a rewrite is necessary be-
cause the document is racist and embarrassing. Of the total 
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sample, 4% mentioned racism as a reason to rewrite; only 2% of 
whites listed racism as a reason compared to 11 % of blacks. 
Among respondents who support constitutional reform there is a 
high, positive association (gamma = 0.82). The total number of 
respondents is low however, 237 out of 600 interviewed or 40%. 
This interracial coalition will be the core of support should a 
reform effort be approved and modernization, not race, will be 
its rhetorical key. 
Reason to Oppose. Most Alabamians who oppose a constitu-
tional rewrite believe it is unnecessary. A moderately positive 
consensus appears to occur between blacks and whites that a re-
write is unnecessary (gamma = 0.60). However, the overall part 
of the total interviewed (99 out of 600 or about 17%) is small. 
This group will be the vocal, or maybe silent, opponent to consti-· 
tutional change. More blacks than whites (22% to 16%) distrust 
the need to rewrite the constitution or its supporters. When the 
governor attempted to call a constitutional convention through 
the state legislature earlier in 2001, the Congressional Black 
Caucus opposed the convention. The rationale behind their deci-
sion was that the new document might be more detrimental to 
the rights of blacks than the document from 1901. This could 
also be the case as to why more blacks distrust supporters of a 
constitutional rewrite. Another 11% of blacks and 13% of whites 
feel there is no one capable of re-writing the constitution . Seven 
percent of whites, but no blacks, fear constitutional refonn 
would lead to a tax increase. 
Knowing Where Change is Needed. Of the respondents who 
believe constitutional reform is necessary, nearly a majority of 
respondents, both white and black do not know where change is 
needed in the constitution. This particular finding relates to pre-
vious research, which suggests that citizens that are more afflu-
ent are more comfortable and have a more positive view of 
constitutional change (Goodman et al.1973). However, of those 
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respondents that identified an area of change, a sizable portion of 
both Blacks and Caucasians (19% overall) believe that the doc-
ument should be updated and that more power is needed at the 
local level (10% overall). 
One of the major problems in the existing document is the 
lack of home rule. While cities have relatively broad powers in 
governing themselves, county governments have virtually no 
authority without first going through the state legislature. As a 
result, local matters not related to their constituency often bogs 
down state legislators. Further, because the constitution requires 
statewide votes on many local issues, a tax increase in a county 
in north Alabama requires a vote by the entire state, which is an 
inefficient process. 
Prefer Legislature. As Table 1 shows, having a constitution-
al convention to reform Alabama 's constitution seems to bode 
well with most respondents (68% overall). However, when pre-
ference for a legislative approach is compared to preference for a 
convention, almost 40% of the respondents oppose holding a 
constitutional convention or prefer the legislature. There is a 
moderately negative association on this concern (gamma= -0.60) 
due to the larger percentage of blacks (36%) who support a legis-
latively driven amendment process compared to whites (15%). 
Prefer Convention. Only about one-third of blacks prefer 
that the legislature have the sole authority for re-writing the doc-
ument. When respondents were asked directly if they would pre-
fer a convention to re-write the constitution, there is general 
agreement among both blacks and whites that a convention is the 
best way to re-write the constitution. One of the major concerns 
about holding a constitutional convention is the selection of del-
egates, whether or not they are appointed or elected (see below) 
The selection of delegates at a constitutional convention could 
determine the output from the convention and ultimately approv-
al or rejection from the community (Cornwell et a/.1970). 
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Elect Delegates. More Alabamians prefer the election of 
delegates as opposed to delegate appointments to a constitutional 
convention (84% to 67%). There is a strong positive association 
among blacks and whites and the election of constitutional con-
vention delegates (gamma = 0. 72). However, even with elec-
tions, there are ongoing concerns about representation results. 
For example, partisan at-large elections would more likely pro-
duce delegates who are party politicians, elected officials or bu-
reaucrats, who may produce a document that preserves the status 
quo. Non-partisan, at-large elections would probably generate 
more refom1-oriented interest and an innovative document. Non-
partisan delegates may lack the organizational influence of party 
structure and be more vulnerable to interest groups influence-a 
potential limit on the innovative nature of a nonpartisan conven-
tion. 
Appoint Delegates. A large percentage of respondents (67%) 
prefer the option of a constitutional convention with no elected 
officials acting as delegates, but there is no underlying agree-
ment among blacks and whites (gamma = 0.40). Leaving out 
elected officials may not lead to recommendations that are polit-
ically acceptable to current officeholders. If united, they could 
become a major obstruction to adopting any changes. A mixture 
of delegates, both elected officials and non-elected officials, may 
be more practical. 
Regardless of how its composition or how it proceeds, ulti-
mately, whether voters would support a document produced 
from a constitutional convention depends on whether there is a 
process of compromise present in the convention. It will be vital 
for all voting blocs in the convention to agree on a proposed 
·document. Further, research also indicates that the "all-or-
nothing" approach to voters accepting the document could be 
problematic for reformers. The idea of accepting a document in 
its entirety has proved to be unworkable for states that have had 
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constitutional conventions in the past because the likelihood of a 
citizen rejecting one portion of the document and voting against 
the entire document is relatively high (Cornwell et al.1970). This 
may be the ultimate flaw of a state constitutional convention and 
require reliance on a process controlled by the state legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The case of Alabama suggests that constitutional revision 
faces many problems that are typical of reform efforts in the 
states. The difficulty of revising a state constitution is as difficult 
as explaining complex issues to the public. Unfortunately, unlike 
other political issues, reformers cannot explain why comprehen-
sive constitutional revision is necessary in a television commer-
cial sound bite. Although each state's situation is different, 
Alabama's traditional political culture that depends on elite con-
trol shows why reform is difficult. Furthermore, Alabama's his-
tory of distrust, election fraud, racism, and demagoguery has 
caused many to become wary of any reform. Yet, the survey data 
reviewed above demonstrate that there are sizeable blocks of 
public support that, if informed and encouraged, will continue to 
press for constitutional modernization. Success in reforming Al-
abama's constitution will require compromises by citizens, inter-
est groups, and elected officials who share concern about the 
state's future and its people. 
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